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As a form of intellectual assault on traditional philosophical trends, 
pragmatism had appeared at the beginning of the 20th century both 
to show what is it like to solve the real epistemological problems 
and prevent us from possible blunders we can make in future. 
Weber and James, the two key thinkers, whose pragmatic moves 
towards the phenomenon of knowledge were revolutionary, will 
be of main interest in the present paper. Not all, of course, but just 
one aspect of pragmatism I wish to examine: how should we really 
conduct ourselves and share our ideas in order to elaborate a more 
adequate knowledge about the world?  
If to ask an intellectual not trained in cumbrous speculations, who 
was William James, her answer may be as follows: James was an 
American professor of philosophy who wanted us to stop thinking 
of the truth as such but rather look for truths that exist in reality we 
live in, verify them and make them useful to our everyday life. 
Such an answer would be correct. Indeed, James was a thinker who 
tried to launch new methods and work with new tools for solving 
old metaphysical questions that lasted actually intriguing up to the 
days when he had finally recognized himself as a philosopher. And 
since then, using George A. Miller‟s words,  “he was forever 
expecting to find something more, something new and unexpected, 
and he tried to leave his theories open towards the future and the 
abundance it would bring.”1 Such an eminent academic don as G. 
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E. Moore says that Professor James wants us to think metaphysics 
(or, philosophy and life as a whole) keeping in mind the following 
propositions: a) we can verify all those of our ideas, which are true; 
b) all those among our ideas, which we can verify, are true; c) all 
our true ideas are useful; d) all those of our ideas, which are useful, 
are true.1  This remark points to James as a metaphysician who 
looks for the practical foundations of the truth and the true 
foundations of our practical life: actions and beliefs. In short, James 
started to think „pragmatically‟ (in 1907 he wrote a book entitled 
Pragmatism) in order to demonstrate how and why all true ideas are 
useful and all useful ideas are true.  
Unlike James, Max Weber does not consider pragmatism as a 
method of his philosophy. He elaborates a new science called 
sociology; this should grow up in the genuine theory of society 
which would be capable to give a true picture of social 
stratification and of the man‟s needs which compose the central 
problems of any society. From this point of view, Weber invents a 
real pragmatist sociology whose task was to deal with such 
problems and possibly solve them. The goal of this essay is to show 
that pragmatism of both authors, even if one counts the numerous 
methodological distinctions between them, is based on a more 
profound epistemological necessity to crush a barrier between 
metaphysical knowledge and practical sphere, between truth and 
use.  
I shall take the sociology of Weber first. In his paper Science as a 
Vocation2 (originally entitled Wissenschaft als Beruf) Weber 
introduces the word Beruf (vocation, calling) playing a crucial role 
in his conception of a scientific man, e.g., one who makes science. It 
seems that the English translations of this word/concept are not 
satisfactory enough. However, this is a matter of importance. We 
will hardly understand a true Weber without getting into the real 
artist‟s true ideas of pragmatic structure of science and man in 
science. So, this concept is not only semantically but 
epistemologically important in Weber‟s explanation of pragmatism 
in Science as a Vocation. Let me specify it. The term Beruf in the 
Weberian sense means „calling to the duty,‟ „to use the gift‟ by 
which one has been endowed, or rather, Beruf is one‟s duty to use 
his natural gift, to bring this gift to a society where one is up to be a 
man of science. Anybody has his/her own Beruf, using of which 
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socializes a human nature and implants a man into the system of a 
social order. What is important in the Weberian concept is that 
Beruf is not only a potential possibility to constitute a human 
nature through the mechanism of social interaction but also the 
extreme necessity to do it, in other words, without Beruf a man 
cannot occupy his place in the social space. Weber insists on the 
fact that in the capitalistic society a man constitutes himself 
through the use of his Beruf and also Beruf constructs a man as a 
part of social organism. Beruf thus is the use of a natural gift and, 
owing to that, the realization by a man his social predestination. 
For Weber Beruf is the actualization of a human essence, a sort of 
juncture which has the forms of a conscious activity within the 
society. Weber says: 
Naturally, one always receives the answer: 'Of 
course, I live only for my “calling” [Beruf]." This 
much I deem necessary to say about the external 
conditions of the academic man‟s vocation. But I 
believe that actually you wish to hear of something 
else, namely of the inward calling for 
science[Weber‟s italics].3 
As we see Weber intends to consider Beruf as the sociological 
concept of social interaction between people with different Berufs 
(with different „calls for their duty‟) but also as the new paradigm 
of science constructing not only the ideology of science but also the 
use of science and the place and attitude of man to the 
phenomenon of science. By and large, science, in Weber‟s eyes, 
should become a sort of the social objectivization of Beruf, of what 
man has by nature and what he ought to realize as his duty before 
society. Quite important to maintain that the Weberian concept is 
not the concept explaining the sociological status of science, but the 
notion pointing to the position of man in science. To put more 
precisely, Weber here speaks of a certain sociological interaction 
between man and science, on the one hand, through the state of 
Beruf man realizes his potential skills in science, he becomes a 
scholar with more or less revolutionary ideas and, by doing so, 
actualizes his natural gift constituting himself as a socially 
significant being, on the other hand, science itself, using human 
potentials, grows up and requires from man more and more 
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intensive execution of his Beruf, science just calls man to the total 
actualization of his gifts and to the increase of his activities. So, the 
true meaning of Weber‟s concept lies in the total use of human 
possibilities, his scientific skills which enlarge the field of Beruf and 
at the same time the horizon of the social. I think it is quite obvious 
that the Weberian concept of Beruf, of vocation is pragmatist by the 
very spirit of this concept. The structure of science, for Weber, is 
the totality of use of man and his abilities to make scientific 
discoveries and produce new ideas which would lead to the new 
scientific results and already these results will extend the limits of 
Beruf ad infinitum. Weber himself more than hints that such a 
manner of a sociological connection between man and science is 
akin to the capitalistic era of production. Man uses science as a tool 
for the enlargement of his social significance and for the 
actualization of the human potentials and science, in turn, uses 
man for the increase of its practical power. In the epoch of 
capitalism the behavior of man in science is structured as a Beruf-
drive. A scientific man, any professional scholar does not consider 
himself out of the field of the realization of his skills, without those 
ideas which can lead him to some new results and he needs those 
results on the basis of which he can produce some new ideas. What 
I call „a Beruf-drive‟ is the essence of the Weberian pragmatic 
method which he applies to the consideration of the phenomenon 
of science in the age of capitalism. Man looks at science not as at an 
innocent intellectual game but as at the tool to increase his 
potential opportunities and to receive the best practical results 
from it not only for the sake of scientific progress but also for his 
own reason. Results which can make his Beruf more global and 
powerful. In Science as a Vocation Weber puts it as follows: 
Scientific works certainly can last as „gratification‟ 
because of their artistic quality, or they may remain 
important as a means of training. Yet they will be 
surpassed scientifically-let that be repeated-for it is 
our common fate and, more, our common goal. We 
cannot work without hoping that others will 
advance further than we have. In principle, this 
progress goes on ad infinitum. And with this we 
come to inquire into the meaning of science. For, 
after all, it is self-evident that something 
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subordinate to such a law is sensible and 
meaningful in itself. Why does one engage in doing 
something that in reality never comes, and never 
can come, to an end?4 
Thus Weber seems to seek a certain pragmatist sense of science. For 
him science also is the tool of the social interaction between the 
different generations of scholars and of course between the 
scholars with different Beruf. If so, science is as well the manner of 
influence of one scholar on the other through the interchange of 
ideas and results, through the degrees of the realization of Beruf 
and through the discoveries of the other‟s potentials. For Weber 
science becomes one of the pragmatic structures of the general 
sociology of knowledge where man actualizes his own social 
significance. This actualization of man as a scientific figure, as a 
scholar or thinker inevitably elicits what Weber calls „personality‟ 
which grows up from the substance of Beruf. To be sure, the 
Weberian concept of personality (die Personlichkeit) is the important 
element of his pragmatic sociology, it means that stage which a 
person (das Subject) reaches through the use of his Beruf, through 
the practical embodiment of his natural potentials. From Weber‟s 
point of view, science for man is just the device to accomplish his 
personality, any subject uses science for his own need, but science 
as a vocation, has a specific feature that in this use science itself 
increases more and more and begins to require more and more 
human possibilities. In this reciprocal use man and science come to 
a certain level when they cannot exist one from another. For 
Weber, this is an important symptom of the capitalistic epoch of 
scientific development: the pragmatic paradigm of the human 
relation to science goes off the limits of pure philosophical or 
historical interest and becomes a kind of ideology. An analogy 
could be drawn between the pragmatist‟s relation to science and 
the capitalistic scholar and his deep 'rootedness' in the growth of 
science (such an analysis of the phenomenon of science is also 
common to some modern German thinkers as Habermas, Luhman, 
Rapp and others). This growth of knowledge and the 
demystification of science Weber names „intellectualization‟ that, 
for him, characterizes the present state of science. The process of 
intellectualization also signifies the pragmatic attitude towards the 
phenomenon of science, it really means that man comes across the 
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numerous differences and the ramifications of a scientific 
knowledge. In order to execute his Beruf man has to confront a 
problem of choices. He realizes that science is no longer a sort of 
myth or mystery, and it is not only him who chooses science but 
also science that takes him as the exigency for its growth and 
development. Weber points out: 
Scientific progress is a fraction, the most important 
fraction, of the process of intellectualization which 
we have been undergoing for thousands of years 
and which nowadays is usually judged in such an 
extremely negative way.5 
And further: 
One need no longer have recourse to magical means 
in order to master or implore the spirits, as did the 
savage, for whom such mysterious powers existed. 
Technical means and calculations perform the 
service. This above all is what intellectualization 
means.6   
It should also be maintained that, for Weber, personality, in the 
epoch of capitalism and scientific growth, requires commitment to 
certain ultimate values and meanings of life, the nature of such a 
commitment is distinct in the different life-spheres. This is again 
the problem of choice and the realization of a personal calling. In 
other words, the structure of probity, of what Weber calls 
Redlichkeit (the term also belongs to the Weberian pragmatic 
sociology), is dependent on the life-sphere in which this 
commitment—the commitment of choice—expresses itself, that is, 
each life-sphere embodies its own criteria of this probity. This 
suggestion can be grounded by specifying  the distinct criteria of 
probity in the spheres of science and politics.  
In his work Science as a Vocation, Weber turns to such charismatic 
artist (in Weber‟s opinion) as Goethe, the man who totally 
accomplished his Beruf, and Beruf of whom had deployed the space 
for the activity of many others. We may note that Weber‟s respect 
for Goethe witnesses that probity in all life-spheres is characterized 
by exclusive devotion to the work at hand. Let us see how Weber 
himself states it: 
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As far as his [man‟s] art is concerned, even with a 
personality of Goethe's rank, it has been detrimental 
to take the liberty of trying to make his 'life' into a 
work of art. And even if one doubts this, one has to 
be a Goethe in order to dare permit oneself such 
liberty. Everybody will admit at least this much: that 
even with a human like Goethe, who appears once 
in a thousand years, this liberty did not discuss that 
today. (...) In the field of science, however, the man 
who makes himself the impresario of the subject to 
which he should be devoted, and steps upon the 
stage and seeks to legitimate himself through the 
experience of asking: How can I prove that I am 
something other than a mere „specialist‟... Today 
such conduct is a crowd phenomenon, and it always 
makes a petty impression and debases the one who 
is thus concerned.7 
This devotion, of which Weber speaks, is taking the form of setting 
out to work and meet the demands of the day. As Weber puts it, 
such a devotion to meeting the demands of the day on one's calling 
leads to a conception of probity, which is the need of the pragmatic 
attitude to the phenomenon of science, is, in any case, the relation 
of passion, a feeling of responsibility, and a sense of proportion. To 
put this in other words, this threefold relation consists of a 
passionate devotion to one's ultimate values, a recognition of the 
demands of the day in somebody's vocation, and the sense of 
distance required to mediate between one's ultimate values and 
such demands. Although Weber specifies these constituents of the 
idea of a scientific probity in relation to the figure of the scholar, 
they remain to be formal or pragmatic requirements of the idea of 
probity and academic vocation. Weber ineffably emphasizes the 
pragmatic attitude to science in the form of a personal Beruf in 
order to show his main sociological directions: science does not 
exist (or, at least, it has no value) out of the sphere of the use of it, 
but this use is the exigency of any man who is willing to work in 
the sphere of science and, by this working, man structures science 
as the realization of his own potential beings. Moreover, in the 
sphere of science, passionate devotion to somebody's ultimate 
values presents itself both in one's conception of science and in the 
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'evaluative ideas' through which the scientist selects and ranks 
phenomena in terms of their cultural and social significance. 
However, the will to science—through Beruf—is not enough in 
itself to constitute, so to say, the pragmatic juncture between man 
and science: "it is a fact that no amount of enthusiasm, however 
sincere and profound it may be, can compel a problem to yield 
scientific results."8 On the contrary, there is a necessity for a feeling 
of responsibility which manifests itself as a concern with the 
demands of the day, as Weber calls it, which in the sphere of 
science means a concern with the great social problems of the 
capitalistic age. According to Weber, the realization of this feeling 
of professional responsibility as scientific practice requires the true 
capacity to distance oneself both from the activity of science as a 
social phenomenon through methodological reflection and from 
one's values through the construction of ideal-type—what in his 
sociology Weber calls 'charisma' or 'charismatic figure'—in which 
one's 'evaluative ideas' are given objective form in relation to the 
social base of capitalism and Protestantism as well.  
Thus we can see the real meaning of the Weberian concept of Beruf 
and his conception of science as a sort of vocation. If one considers 
this notion as a structural one, in a more pragmatic aspect, or as it 
appears in the historical context of Weber's analysis of society this 
key-concept has a twofold nature. Along with the dominance of 
profession, emerging as the internal and external structure of the 
scientist's activity, such an intellectual comes to 'the double 
situation of our time.' On the one hand, the scientist depends on 
the tradition of producing professional labor of 'the professional 
priest of tradition.' On the other hand, this scientist also depends 
on the 'modern' tradition which derives from the monks and from 
the ('ascetic') Protestant understanding of professional work and 
that  which the intellectual takes for consideration together with 
the bourgeois class. For Weber, the congregation of these two 
traditions in the limits of Beruf—science as a vocation—presents 
the twofold structure of this concept owing to which the concept, 
in Weberian sociology, emerges simultaneously as the professional 
and creative activity. This is why Weber strongly rejects the 
interpretation of scientific action, of the scientist who makes a kind 
of creative work, as something that is not rooted in its potentiality, 
in its vocation. Because the real sense of such professions consists 
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in the synthesis of social phenomena and the structure of natural 
universe. This synthesis, according to Weber, forever requires new 
discoveries and a permanent renovation of scientific thought on 
the whole. In Weber's sociology, such a pragmatic paradigm, 
considering a human intellectual activity as the territory of 
interaction between vocation and science and science as a tool to 
evoke human potentials to the real world, could be compared with 
William James's pragmatic theory of truth, for instance, as the 
agreement of ideas or beliefs with reality. 
The pragmatic definition of truth and the revolutionary rejection of 
many other metaphysical and traditional problems of philosophy 
cannot be understood without examining the pragmatist 
elaboration of such concepts as: reality, experience and truth. 
Similar to Weber, for James, as a pragmatist, reality is a collective 
notion for everything that happens, while truth and knowledge 
evoke how all those things that occur together, that intersect one 
another and connect one to another in the world. Things happen or 
take place together in different ways depending upon different 
goals and purposes. So, truth is a common name for all actions and 
all consequences happening as the result of such a 'chaotic 
movement,' in other words, if to sum those conception of truth that 
James elaborates in his collection of essays called Pragmatism, then 
truth is the general name for verification process, like justice and 
democracy are names for those ideas and positions of society 
which we associate with a good life and normal behavior. Thus the 
pragmatist turn, I think, did happen on the scene of philosophy 
and social science when the concept of truth as the ultimate answer 
to some ultimate enigmatic questions have been rejected, and so 
the notion of reality as something unique and fixed no longer work 
as the basic principles of epistemological analysis. If so, one can 
say, we remain in the world without ammo, naked before nature 
and having lost any true epistemology and picture of 'external 
reality.' But this is not true. The Jamesian theory of pragmatism 
does not leave us in this bad situation. James does not neglect such 
questions as 'What is truth?' and 'How can I name the everyday 
gyre of things?,' the wrong way round, James makes these 
questions crucially important for the general pragmatist revision of 
philosophy. His methodological answer to this question is that 
truth or a true proposition should be accepted as such only if it 
Tattva- Journal of Philosophy                                                       ISSN 0975-332X 
26 
 
verifies itself. James often says that just those true ideas or beliefs 
are to be accepted and, as he puts it, adhered to the real world 
which work and verify themselves as the consequences of our 
thinking and re-thinking meeting us on the way of expediency 
(this is a very important point of intersection between James and 
Weber. In the sociological conception of the latter the notion of 
expediency is analyzed at great length. Because for Weber, the goal 
of man and science is to structure itself and reality as the forms of 
expediency and a task of science is to find such an expedient way 
of life). James points out: 
'The true,' to put it briefly, is only the expedient in 
the way of our thinking, just as 'the right' is only the 
expedient in the way of our behaving. Expedient in 
almost any fashion; and expedient in the long run 
and on the whole of course; for what meets 
expediently all the experience in sight won't  
necessarily meet all farther experiences equally 
satisfactorily. Experience, as we know, has ways of 
boiling over, and making us correct our present 
formulas[italics original].9 
In his paper What Pragmatism means James shows the principles of 
how such a pragmatic method works by starting this piece from 
the well-known story of the man, the squirrel and the tree-trunk. 
He tells us how a number of his close friends had fallen into what 
he names a metaphysical dispute. This story is as follows: James's 
friends had imagined a tree-trunk with a squirrel clinging to one 
side of it and a man standing on the other side.—'Does the man go 
round the squirrel or not?—The friend tries to get sight of the squirrel 
by moving round the tree and he fails to do it because the squirrel 
also moves this way in order to keep the tree-trunk between itself 
and the friend. The question, paradoxical enough like Xenon's 
aporia, of their dispute is whether the man went round the squirrel 
or not. What really happens here is that the squirrel is seated on the 
tree and the man went round this tree and so James's friend always 
fails to pass the squirrel. In solving this puzzle James puts the 
appropriate question to his friends: what you really mean when you 
tried to 'go round the squirrel?'  James writes: 
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He [the friend] goes round the tree, sure enough, 
and the squirrel is on the tree; but does he go round 
the squirrel? In the unlimited leisure of the 
wilderness, discussion had been worn threadbare. 
Everyone had taken sides, and was obstinate; and 
the numbers on both sides were even. Each side, 
when I appeared therefore appealed to me to make 
it a majority [...] I immediately sought and found 
one, as follows: "Which party is right," I said, 
"depends on what you practically mean by 'going 
round' the squirrel. If you mean passing from the 
north of him to the east, then to the south, then to 
the west, and then to the north of him again, 
obviously the man does go round him, for he 
occupies these successive position.10 
James describes this situation as purely pragmatic in his sense 
when he says that if, on the contrary, being first in front of him, 
then on the right of him, then behind him, then on his left side, and 
finally to appear in front of him again, then it is quite obvious that 
the man will all the time fail to go round the squirrel and see him, 
for by the compensating movements the squirrel keeps his belly 
turned towards the man forever and his back turned away.  
Needless to say, James solves this metaphysical puzzle by going 
into the heart of his pragmatic method. He actually poses the 
question: how many meanings this world has and on how many 
propositions it is based? What is a true decision of his story?—if so, 
do we really solve a huge number of such metaphysical disputes? 
However, for James, the real problem of it does not consist in an 
affirmative answer or in a somewhat escape from this trap, but it 
consists in the more general question: does a metaphysical 
situation have a real sense. In James's philosophy it has a sense if 
we can experience such a metaphysical situation in the real world, 
so a sense of any situation lies in the actual experience of it. If the 
experience of a metaphysical situation is what gives a meaning to it 
then a meaning of any situation and reality as such appears in the 
experience of the pragmatic use of this meaning, and if so, a 
meaning of any situation consists in the real experience of this 
situation. Ideas and beliefs, I keep in mind, acquire a true sense 
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when I put them in the situation of work, that is when I charge 
them to connect to the real world as the only place where ideas and 
beliefs may receive a certain verification and become meaningful. 
This is why James suggests that criteria by which we have to assess 
a belief which relates to a matter of empirical fact are different from 
those beliefs and ideas which  apply to a belief which is concerned 
only with relations between ideas and these are different again 
from the criteria which apply to ideas and beliefs whose function is 
just to satisfy our mental or emotional demands. James does not 
put much stress on this distinction but they are important for his 
pragmatic investigation of ideas and beliefs which, so to say, did 
not pass the pragmatic control of experience and those that 
acquired a sense through this empirical test. Thus, according to 
James, a true sense of any situation could be received only through 
the verification of ideas and beliefs in the space of the reality of 
things and events. In brief, the Jamesian true sense is the pragmatic 
use of belief which is an experience of the real. So James totally 
destroys priori and transcendental character of truth, stated by the 
previous tradition, and, doing so, he goes further than even 
empiricist philosophy also. Truth not only obeys to experience, but 
also is constituted by experience as the truth of a given situation, as 
something that receives sense from this situation and could not be 
understood out of it. Such a constitution of truth through the 
situation of experience, through a pragmatic testing, is the soul of 
James's pragmatism and, as we can see, is similar to what Weber 
suggests in his sociology of knowledge. The novelty of this method 
James explains as follows: 
Pragmatism represents a perfectly familiar attitude 
in philosophy, the empiricist attitude, but it 
represents it, as it seems to me, both in a more 
radical and in a less objectionable form than it has 
ever yet assumed. A pragmatist turns his back 
resolutely and once for all upon a lot of inveterate 
habits dear to professional philosophers. He turns 
away from abstraction and insufficiency, from 
verbal solutions, from bad a priori reasons, from 
fixed principles, closed systems, and presented 
absolutes and origins. He turns towards 
concreteness and adequacy, towards facts, towards 
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action and towards power. That means the 
empiricist temper regnant and the rationalist temper 
sincerely given up. It means the open air and 
possibilities of nature, as against dogma, artificiality, 
and the pretense of finality in truth.11  
These words, full of a Weberian passion, betrays James not only as 
the reformer of the previous philosophical tradition but also the 
philosopher who aims to create a new type of philosophizing, to 
create a man with a new horizon of thought. I think James moves 
beyond the boundaries of so-called professional or academic 
philosophy, he tries to arrange the new approach to reality itself. 
Pragmatism here is not just a manner of thought but also a manner 
of being. What are the types of reality that James considers by 
virtue of his pragmatic method? To be sure, the system of realities, 
of which James speaks, is presented in many levels or parts like 
there is a great number of true beliefs passed through the 
experience of different situations. In struggling against a prioris 
and the past metaphysics James defines one type of reality as those 
reality with which truths concern themselves or it is the reality of 
verified sensations. James argues that sensations are pressed upon 
us, we have no idea where they come from, and regarding their 
nature, origination and verity nobody holds control. According to 
James, human sensations cannot be either true nor false, they only 
show the fact of their presence. They themselves, teaches us James, 
are rally neutral from the logical point of view. What could be true 
or false is just our names or interpretations which we give to them, 
our theories and hypotheses which we apply to them in order to 
understand the enigmatic nature of sensations. James also pictures 
another type of reality when he speaks of our ideas and beliefs 
taking place in the span between our sensations and the concepts 
of mind where these sensations are imprinted. Dealing with this 
type of reality James meets its double character. On the one hand, 
we often operate with those relations which have a very mutable 
and accidental features, for example, the relation of temporal and 
spatial sensations we get in different periods of our life. On the 
other hand, we are mingling with those relations that have for us a 
more essential and habitual characters which are grounded in the 
pragmatic use of these relations as more or less concrete notions. 
To take James's example from Pragmatism where he gives such 
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notions as 'likeness' and 'unlikeness.' According to James, these 
terms don't have an enigmatic nature and are not therefore the real 
sensations. Why? Because we know how to use them and what 
they mean for us in some different situations of our everyday life. 
Simply, we receive these notions from the experience of pragmatic 
practice but not from the hands of nature or God. However, for 
James, both types of relation are matters of perception, they have a 
factual basis. The latter type of relation is the one which actually 
forms a more practical picture of reality within our theory of 
knowledge, this type of relation is construed on the ground of the 
comparison of different sense date. These relation also constitute 
our logical and mathematical hypotheses of the real world. But all 
these hypotheses and theories are not of course transcendental 
paradigms of reality, all of them, as well as reality itself take place 
in a certain temporal and historical phase of human development. 
The pragmatic practice of any notions and concepts, constituting 
and testing our comprehension of reality, is a historical event 
having no value beyond the limits of those historical situation 
where we exist, and it has nothing to do with a sort of pure science 
or transcendental knowledge like in Kant or Husserl. Andrew Reck 
correctly notes that: 
[...] pragmatism is an epistemological temporalism. 
Interpreting "meaning" and "truth" in terms of 
intertemporal relations between successive phases 
of experience, it teaches that conception, judgment, 
or belief is always an act of a human being standing 
at a specific moment in the time-flow, facing the 
future by means of thought, and himself moving 
forward into that future even while he thinks.12 
As we see, like Weber, James places the epistemological technique 
of pragmatism in the historical context which, being always linked 
to reality, generates the system of meanings that we in turn receive 
as the true or false picture of the real world. To maintain that this 
point makes James's pragmatism close to the Weberian sociology 
because for both of them sense is constituted through the historical 
experience of human development and only such an experience 
can settle the correct relation between meaning we have in our 
mind and reality we live. We cannot receive sense (true or false), if 
this sense does not pass the contextual examination of situation in 
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which it would work as true or false. Moreover, in the Jamesian 
reality, such categories as true and false have no a priori position, 
they cannot be 'artificially' obtained from the transcendental 
system of knowledge, these true and false derive from the 
experience of a real situation which meets a lot of human interests 
and ambitions. To put this another way, one can interpret the same 
situation or fact quite differently. For example, Gorbachev's 
reforms in the USSR: some would spell as the turn to democracy 
and others would say that it is the disruption of the great country. 
Both of the speakers tell us the truth but in order to agree with one 
of them or with both of them we should realize the concrete 
situation of these speakers. If the first is a successive politician and 
he has his own interests in the politics of reforms he tells us no 
doubt truth which is the truth in his situation, but if another one is 
an official lost his job by virtue of reforms he of course tells us truth 
which is the real truth in his situation. This example shows that, for 
James, what we say about reality is dependent upon the point of 
view or context into which we are thrown out. James is sure that 
both the sensational and the rational types of reality are dumb, 
they speak nothing of themselves. What do they mean is only that 
we mean when we speak of them. So, according to James, what we 
receive as the order of things and those relations we meet between 
them are determined by our personal interests and goals. By 
proclaiming it, James destroys the traditional a priorism of the 
previous metaphysics, for him, even if we had some ideas and 
beliefs which were significant for us and what we have taken for 
granted before our access to the pragmatic experience of reality, 
these ideas and beliefs will be changed or selected by a number of 
situation that we pass during our life.  
The Jamesian conception of reality in general is that reality itself 
and the system of things does not begin to be and cease to exist 
when a human being looks at it trying to grasp it through the 
concepts of his mind. According to such pragmatism, reality and 
also truth are the running universe, interpretation and description 
of which add something important and significant to their nature, 
and whose nature constructs human knowledge itself through the 
historical phases of its development. Nevertheless, there is a 
difference between  Jamesian pragmatism and the rationalism of 
the Weberian sort. From James's point of view, for rationalism, 
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reality is ready-made and complete from all eternity, while for 
pragmatism it is still in the making process and awaits part of its 
completion from the human activity from the conflict of 
interpretation which by all means is directed on the future. On the 
one side, for James, the world is absolutely secure, on the other it is 
still pursuing its adventures and nobody knows what will this 
movement bring us as a kind of its truth. Reality and truth always 
appear in the forms of experience which seems not to have the end 
in this or that situation. Everything changes. The rationalist 
approach, detaching idea and belief from the uniqueness of 
experience, devaluates the necessity of the pragmatic experience of 
all and all beliefs. On the contrary, from the pragmatist's point of 
view, is a collective notion signifying those things that both resist 
to human desire and provokes it and stipulates the work of the 
human mind. In his collection Pragmatism James more than once 
maintains that the universe is construing and changing in response 
to human wish to know more and more about it. Reality thus is the 
general name for the whole phenomena of circumstances and 
happenings. In short, what the pragmatist expunges from his 
method is the rationalist tendency to oppose that immutable reality 
to the set of various realities that human experiences afford us. For 
the pragmatist there is no such thing as 'a privileging reality' or a 
substantial reality influencing on the other types of reality which 
we meet in our lifetime. For James, the pragmatists should reject 
such a substantiation of one reality at the expense of another. No 
substantial concepts can be applied to the real world which will 
form the only valuable attitude to things. The phenomenon of 
reality has to be interpreted as an accumulation of tools for 
interacting between the infinite number of situation and beliefs 
that we test and present through the facts of experience.  
If we summarize all this then we have to state that a main principle 
of James's radical pragmatism and his theory of truth is the 
rejection that the human sensations and beliefs are separated 
entities signifying reality as atomic units. In the Jamesian 
pragmatism ideas and beliefs acquire their meaning and value 
through the experimental relations to the system of things. Our 
relations and ideas, says James, appear as the sort of experience 
and work by dint of the pragmatic practice and only so they are 
meaningful and valuable for the human consciousness. This is 
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why… consciousness itself is a kind of function structuring a 
human vision of reality through the use of concepts which show 
that the relation between nature and world is eternal.      
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